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BANKRUPT'S OBLIGATION TO REMOVE TOXIC
WASTE CONSTITUTES A "CLAIM": OHIO v.
WILLIAM LEE KOVACS ENTERPRISES
The purpose of the federal Bankruptcy Act' is to give debtors a fresh
start while treating creditors equitably.' Recently, conflicts have devel-
oped between the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start ' 3 objective and state
environmental interests.4 Traditionally, a state's interest in protecting
public health and safety is beyond the reach of federal legislation ab-
sent a direct conflict with federal law.5 Thus, a state's interest in envi-
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1982)). The
Bankruptcy Reform Act, which repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, became effective
for cases filed on or after October 1, 1979.
2. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (Bankruptcy Code gives
debtors "a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of preexisting debts"); see also Kothe v. R.L. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1930)
(Code provides for an equitable settling of creditors' claims by usurping the debtor's
control over the distributions of his assets); William v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
236 U.S. 549, 544-45 (1915) (purpose of Bankruptcy Act is to "convert the assets of the
bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors.., and permit [the debtor] to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfor-
tunes"). See also In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) (liqui-
dation proceeding under Chapter 7 is to provide fair distribution of debtor's assets to
creditors), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1985); In re Sampson, 17 Bankr. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1982) (pur-
pose of Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a fresh start). See generally Note, Cleanup
Order and the Bankruptcy Code: An Exception to the Automatic Stay, 59 ST. JOHNS L.
REv. 292, 293 (1985) (discussion of the exceptions to the automatic stay in bankruptcy).
3. See supra note I and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1984) (state injunctive order not subject to Code's automatic stay provisions); In re
Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (Bankruptcy Reform Act does not per-
mit abandonment of toxic waste site), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986); State v. Electrical Utils., 41
Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (automatic stay does not apply to state injunction to enforce
cleanup of toxic wastes in a Chapter 11 proceeding). But see In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d
454 (6th Cir. 1982) (state injunction to enforce the cleanup of a toxic waste site is sub-
ject to automatic stay), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983), vacated as moot,
755 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the automatic stay provision.
5. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (there is a basic as-
Washington University Open Scholarship
286 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:285
ronmental protection will take priority over the Code unless a direct
conflict exists with the Code and its objectives of protecting debtors
and creditors.6 In Ohio v. William Lee Kovacs Enterprises7 the United
States Supreme Court held that a debtor's obligation to remove toxic
wastes was a "claim"8 under the Code and, therefore, dischargeable
like other monetary judgments.
William Lee Kovacs was the chief executive officer and majority
stockholder of Chem-Dyne Corporation.' In September 1976, Ohio
sued Kovacs and the Chem-Dyne Corporation in state court for violat-
ing state and local environmental statutes.' In July 1979, Kovacs set-
tled the action by agreeing to clean up the Chem-Dyne site.'" After
Kovacs and the other defendants failed to comply with the agreement,
the state court appointed a receiver to take possession of Kovacs' prop-
sumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law); see also Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (supremacy clause will not pre-
empt a state regulation unless the nature of the subject matter allows no other conclu-
sion or it is Congress' explicit intent to displace state law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (a state law is valid unless it is an obstacle to the accomplishment and
objectives of Congress).
6. See Note, supra note 1, at 295 (conflict between the Third and Sixth Circuits
concerning whether a corporate debtor's pre-petition cleanup order should be exempt
from the automatic stay).
7. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
8. Section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a:
(A) right to payment, whteher or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right of payment....
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
9. 469 U.S. at 276. Kovacs was one of two principle corporate officers and was a
defendant both in an official and individual capacity. He was a defendant in an individ-
ual capacity because the state contended that many of the unlawful acts were committed
in his presence and under his direction. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Ohio v. William Lee
Kovacs Enterprises, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
10. 469 U.S. at 276. The environmental violations included polluting public waters,
maintaining a public nuisance, and causing fish kills. Id. Chem-Dyne dumped toxic
pollutants into public waters in violation of state law. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 6111 (Anderson 1977). Ohio also accused Chem-Dyne of causing a nuisance in viola-
tion of state law. See id. § 3767 (Anderson 1980); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at
4.
11. 469 U.S. at 276. The agreement also prohibited the defendants from causing
further pollution and ordered them to pay $75,000 to the state as compensation for the
fish kills. Id.
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erty and other assets to conduct the cleanup.12 Before the receiver fin-
ished, however, Kovacs filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.13 In an
attempt to apply Kovacs' postbankruptcy earnings toward the unfin-
ished cleanup, Ohio then motioned in state court to discover Kovacs'
current income and assets. 4 The federal bankruptcy court granted
Kovacs' motion to stay the state court proceedings, holding that Ohio
could not seek a monetary payment from a bankrupt debtor. 5 The
district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's decision.16 Ohio also commenced a second action (Ko-
vacs 11) in bankruptcy court seeking a ruling that Kovacs could not
discharge his obligation under the Code because it did not qualify as a
"debt" 17 or "claim."1" The Sixth Circuit concluded that the state's
12. Id.
13. Id. Kovacs originally filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Code. See In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 985 (6th Cir. 1984). See also In re Canarico
Quarries, 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (automatic stay will not be granted to corpo-
ration under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy when corporation has violated state environmen-
tal laws and seeks to continue operation in violation of state laws); In re Thomas
Solvent, 44 Bankr. 83 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (while a Chapter 7 debtor may enjoin state
from taking action against debtor to purify contaminated ground water, Chapter 11
debtor engaged in business is not entitled to such an injunction because debtor in posses-
sion may not operate a business and avoid its responsibility to society by filing Chapter
11 petition).
14. 469 U.S. at 276.
15. 29 Bankr. 816, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Kovacs argued that the automatic stay
provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982), required relief from the state court proceeding.
Whether a court considers an injunctive obligation a monetary judgment is significant
because enforcement of a monetary judgment is subject to the automatic stay. The
applicable portions of § 362(b) provide that:
The filing of a petition [in bankruptcy] . . . does not operate as a stay-..
(4) Under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continua-
tion of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmen-
tal units police or regulatory power;
(5) Under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental unit to enforce such governmental units police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362.
16. 681 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1982). The court rejected Ohio's argument that it was
merely trying to enforce Kovacs' equitable obligation to clean up the site. Id. The
court noted that the state appointed a receiver and that "[there is very little substance
to distinguish that order and a money judgment." Id. But cf. Penn Terra v. Depart-
ment of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). Section 101(11) defines a debt as "liability on a
claim."
18. See id. § 101(4). See supra note 8 for the Code definition of claim. Ohio argued
that Kovacs' obligation was not a claim because the state had no right to payment as an
1987]
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action was a "claim" that Kovacs could discharge under the Code.1 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion.2 °
Under the police power states can legislate to protect the health and
safety of their citizens.2 ' Nevertheless, federal law preempts state po-
lice power laws if they directly conflict. 2 For example, the Supreme
Court invalidated the portion of a state automobile safety statute that
conflicted with the Bankruptcy Code in Perez v. Campbell.2 3 In Perez
part of an Arizona law provided that a discharge in bankruptcy follow-
ing an automobile tort judgment did not relieve the debtor of his obli-
gation to repay the judgment.24 The state enforced the repayment by
withholding the driving privileges of the state.25 The Court held that
alternate remedy to compliance with the injunction. 469 U.S. at 279. Ohio attempted
to equate the statutory language "breach of performance," found in the Code's defini-
tion of "claim," with a breach of contractual performance. Id. If Ohio were successful,
it could levy on Kovacs' wages after the automatic stay expired or after his bankruptcy
case closed. See Kovacs, 717 F.2d at 986 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Kovacs, 29 Bankr.
816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 1982)). Kovacs argued that the debtors' conduct was a violation of
law, not a breach of performance or contractual duty. 469 U.S. at 279.
19. 717 F.2d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 1983). The court noted that Kovacs could not
personally clean up the Chem-Dyne site; he could only pay money. Id. The court also
noted that Ohio recognized the pursuit of payment as an alternative to personal per-
formance, and that the state's claim "cannot be concealed by legerdemain or linguistic
gymnastics." Id.
20. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
21. See, e.g., A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 471 (1976) (states have broad
power to legislate protection for their citizens in matters such as public health); Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (it is elemental that states have broad
power under their police power to enforce standards of conduct relating to their citi-
zens' health). See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
442 (1960); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949).
22. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra note 5 for cases dealing with federal
preemption of state law.
23. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
24. Id. at 642-43. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (Supp. 1970-71) provides
that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall
not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article."
25. 402 U.S. at 642. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(A) (Supp. 1970-71) pro-
vides that the license and registration "shall remain suspended and shall not be re-
newed, nor shall any license or registration be thereafter issued in the name of that
person.., until the person gives proof of financial responsibility .... " 402 U.S. at 642.
In Perez the state court entered a tort judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Perez following
an automobile accident. Id. at 638. The couple filed for bankruptcy and at the same
time their car license and registration was suspended until the outstanding judgment
was satisfied. Id. at 639.
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the Arizona provision that protected judgment creditors directly con-
flicted with the Code's "fresh start"" principle."
While it is settled that the Bankruptcy Code preempts a conflicting
state law, whether a conflict exists is not always clear. Thus, courts
can interpret such situations either in favor of the Code or state law.
Three examples of potential conflicts between the Code and state envi-
ronmental laws involve property abandonment, 2 8 the automatic stay,
29
and the discharge."a Under the Code, a trustee can abandon property
that has little value or is burdensome to the bankrupt estate."a The
Supreme Court, however, held that a trustee could not abandon prop-
erty in violation of New York and New Jersey state and city environ-
mental laws in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection.3 2 In Midlantic, New York and New Jersey
opposed the abandonment of waste oil processing and storage facilities
containing hazardous chemicals.3" The Court held that without ex-
press congressional intent, the Code did not allow a trustee to abandon
26. See supra note 2.
27. 402 U.S. at 656. The court added that any state legislation that frustrates the
Code's purpose is invalid under the supremacy clause, even if the state legislative pur-
pose was legitimate. Id. at 651-52.
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 for the Code's abandonment provision.
29. See supra note 15 for the Code's automatic stay provision.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. A court will generally discharge debts that arose before
the action commenced unless the debtor is a corporation or the debtor has intentionally
defrauded a creditor or officer of the bankrupt estate. Id.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 554. This section provides that "[a]fter notice and a hearing,
the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate, or
that is of inconsequential value to the estate." Id.
32. 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
33. Id. at 758. Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) had stored over 70,000
gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil at its New York City facility. Id. In New
Jersey, Quanta had violated its operating permit by accepting more than 400,000 gal-
lons of oil contaminated with PCB. Id. at 757. After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment of the two sites. Id. at 758. Upon aban-
donment, the trustee discontinued the 24-hour guard service and the fire suppression
system. Id. As a result of the abandonment, New York spent about $2.5 million to
decontaminate the site. Id.
New York and New Jersey separately appealed the Quanta abandonment to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which held in both cases that the Bankruptcy Court
erred in allowing abandonment. Id. at 759. See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739
F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (New York); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d
Cir. 1984) (New Jersey). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the
cases. 106 S. Ct. at 759.
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property in violation of state and local health and safety laws. 4 The
Court examined federal law and found several indications that Con-
gress did not intend to displace state environmental laws in the situa-
tion presented. 5 Furthermore, the Court stated that there were
judicially recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power
and, therefore, abandonment was impermissible without adequate safe-
guards to protect public health and safety.3 6
Another example of potential conflict arises when a state seeks en-
forcement of an environmental cleanup order and the bankrupt debtor
is entitled to an automatic stay that forbids state enforcement of a
money judgment.3 7 In 1982 the Sixth Circuit found the interests of the
Code superior to state environmental interests in In re Kovacs (Kovacs
1).3' The issue in Kovacs I was whether the injunctive obligation to
clean up a waste site issued against an individual debtor was subject to
an automatic stay.3 9 In Kovacs I the court granted the debtor an auto-
34. 106 S. Ct. at 759-60.
35. Id. at 760-62. The first indication that Congress did not intend to displace state
police power regulations are the Bankruptcy Code exceptions to the automatic stay. Id.
at 760-61. The second indication is 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires a trustee to
operate property in his possession according to the laws of the state. Id. at 761. The
third consideration is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which authorizes
the United States to seek restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that may be
dangerous to public health. Id. at 762.
36. Id. The Court did not disclose what safeguards would "adequately" protect the
public's health and safety. The Court, however, noted the minimal steps not taken by
Quanta to reduce public danger after the abandonment of the New York facility:
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to reduce immi-
nent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deterio-
rating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment
at both sites aggravated already existing dangers by halting security measures that
prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire.
Id. at 758 n.3.
37. See supra note 15 for the Code's automatic stay provision.
38. 681 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983),
vacated as moot, 755 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1985).
39. The pertinent language states that an action does not operate as a stay if it is for
"the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5)
(1982).
In Kovacs I, Ohio could have enforced the injunction through an exception from the
automatic stay or by a judicial finding that the debt was not dischargeable. If Kovacs'
debt could not be stayed or discharged he must immediately pay the debt from his
assets. If the debt could not be discharged but could be stayed, the state must wait for
payment from Kovacs' bankruptcy assets like all other creditors. If the debt is dis-
chargeable, the automatic stay becomes irrelevant because the obligation to pay the debt
is extinguished.
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matic stay, reasoning that Ohio was actually seeking a monetary judg-
ment to satisfy Kovacs' injunctive obligation.' The court stated that
though section 362 of the Code permits states to enforce their police
power regulations, it restricts the ability to collect money in enforce-
ment eForts.4 1 The court concluded that if Ohio proceeded with its
action, it would subvert the Code's purpose of rehabilitating debtors
and relieving them from the future harassment of creditors.42
In a similar case, the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's environ-
mental interests did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. In Penn
Terra v. Department of Environmental Resources4 3 the court held that
a state court order directing a debtor corporation to correct environ-
mental violations was not subject to an automatic stay.44 The debtor in
Penn Terra, as in Kovacs I, failed to comply with the court order and
subsequently filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7.45 Similarly, both the
bankruptcy court and district court held that Pennsylvania was actu-
ally seeking a money judgment and stayed the state's claim.46
The Third Circuit, however, found the Kovacs I definition of "money
judgment" unduly broad.47 The court stated that the term should be
interpreted narrowly to leave the states with as much of their police
40. 681 F.2d at 456. The court adopted the bankruptcy court's holding that, in
substance, no difference existed between efforts to collect money from a debtor by secur-
ing a court order and efforts to enforce a money judgment against him. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 278. See also Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41 Bankr. 874, 877 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (state action to enforce cleanup order not an attempt to get money judgment); In
re Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (if cause of action arose before bank-
ruptcy proceeding then state action to enforce environmental cleanup is exempt from
automatic stay), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985).
45. The state claimed several violations including mining in a restricted area, failure
to maintain adequate erosion and sediment controls, and failure to close a deep mine
pit. See Penn Terra v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 24 Bankr. 427 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
46. 733 F.2d at 270. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Penn Terra and con-
cluded that any judgment requiring the expenditure of money was a monetary judg-
ment. 24 Bankr. at 433. The Third Circuit rejected this interpretation. 733 F.2d at
277.
47. 733 F.2d at 277. The Third Circuit concluded that most injunctions require the
expenditure of money, and if courts considered every injunction a money judgment the
exceptions to automatic stay would become virtually useless. Id. at 277-78. The court
also stated that virtually everything can be reduced to a monetary sum and an injunc-
tion that does not require some loss or expenditure of money "may often be an effective
nullity." Id. at 278.
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power as possible.4 8 The court employed a two prong test to determine
if the proceeding was, in essence, to enforce a money judgment. First,
the court examined whether the remedy sought could be reduced to a
sum certain. 49 Second, the court evaluated whether the remedy was
intended to compensate past injuries or prevent future harm. ° The
court concluded that the state brought an equitable action to prevent
future harm and, therefore, the suit was not an action to enforce a
money judgment.5 '
A third conflict between the Code and state environmental laws
arises when a debtor attempts to discharge an injunctive obligation in
bankruptcy. Whether an injunction requiring a debtor to clean up an
environmental hazard is dischargeable in bankruptcy depends on
whether the obligation is a "claim." 52 The Bankruptcy Reform Act
48. Id. at 278. The court of appeals noted that Kovacs I supported the bankruptcy
court's interpretation, but it maintained that because the Supreme Court vacated Kovacs
I the decision has no authoritative value. Id. at 277 n. 11. The Third Circuit also de-
clined to predict how the Sixth Circuit would decide the Penn Terra case. Id.
49. Id. at 276-77.
50. Id. The court found that any action that seeks to prevent future culpable con-
duct would not be an action for a money judgment. Id. at 277. The court asserted that
a traditional money judgment required liquidated damages and the nature of injunctive
relief is to prevent future conduct, not to compensate with money. Id.
51. Id. at 277-78. See Wise, High Court Hears Arguments on Thorny Bankruptcy
Issue, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 3. The author argues that the creation of an
exception for environmental obligations would give cleanup orders priority over all
other creditors, including tax collectors. Id. at 4, col. 3.
Two factual differences distinguish the Penn Terra and Kovacs I cases. First, in Penn
Terra the state had a claim against a corporation. 733 F.2d at 269. In Kovacs I the
claim was against an individual. 681 F.2d at 454. A claim is a right to payment, or an
equitable remedy that gives rise to a right of payment. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
involving a corporation, after the payment of creditors' claims, the corporation's obliga-
tions are dismissed because the corporation is dissolved after bankruptcy. When an
individual debtor files a Chapter 7 proceeding, however, the individual remains after the
claims of creditors have been paid. The individual, however, does not remain liable for
his debts after bankruptcy unless his obligations are not "claims" under the Code and,
therefore, are not extinguishable. This was the state's argument in Kovacs I. See infra
notes 57-65. See Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 1199, 1202-03 (1984) (if obligation of corporation is not a claim, state will not
have recourse to bankruptcy assets and will not recover because corporation dissolves
after bankruptcy). Second, the appointment of a receiver to collect Kovacs' assets in
order to defray cleanup costs also distinguishes Kovacs I from Penn Terra. See Kovacs
I, 681 F.2d at 484.
52. See supra note 8 for the Code's definition of claim. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding the assets of the debtor are sold and the proceeds are distributed according
to 11 U.S.C. § 726. Section 726 refers only of payments on claims. See Baird & Jack-
son, supra note 5 1, at 1203. See also Mathews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bank-
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broadened the scope of a "claim" by amending the definition of that
term.53 The definition clearly makes all monetary rights subject to
bankruptcy proceedings by including any right to payment as a
claim.54 Similarly, the provision states that a wide range of equitable
rights are also claims in bankruptcy. 55 Precisely which equitable rights
are claims, however, is not clear from the statute or legislative
history.5 6
In Ohio v. William Lee Kovacs Enterprises (Kovacs I)5" the Court
addressed the issue of whether the obligation to clean up the Chem-
ruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. L.J. 221-46 (1983) (claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy
but problem arises when determining what constitutes a "nonclaim" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(4)).
53. The House originally defined a claim more broadly than the comparable con-
cept of provable debts in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. A 1978 House report stated:
The definition [of claim] also includes as a claim an equitable right to performance
that does not give rise to a right of payment. By this broadest possible definition
and by use of the term through the title 11,... the bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor... will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It
permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6266 [emphasis added] (the same comment in the Senate
report is found at S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5785, 5807-08). See Mathews, supra note 52, at 237
(argues that Congress intended a sweeping definition of claims including all monetary
obligations); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 101.04 (Levin & Klee 15th ed.
1984) (Congress intended a broad definition of claim).
54. See supra note 8.
55. Id.
56. See Mathews, supra note 52, at 237 (status of claims under § 101(4)(B) is not
always certain; the version adopted by Congress is seemingly less inclusive than original
version).
An equitable remedy is considered a claim under § 101(4)(B) if two requirements are
fulfilled. First, there must be a breach of performance. Second, the breach must give
rise to a right of payment. The legislative history does not elaborate on these require-
ments, but only summarizes the scope of § 101(4)(B) and provides an example of a
subsection (B) claim. Senator De Concini remarked that:
Section 101(4)(B)... is intended to cause the liquidation ... of contingent rights of
payment of which there may be an alternative equitable remedy with the result that
the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being discharged in Bankruptcy. For
example, in some states, a judgment for specific performance may be satisfied by an
alternative right to payment, in the event performance is refused; in that event, the
creditor entitled to specific performance would have a 'claim' for purposes of a
proceeding under title II.
124 CONG. REc. 33,992 (1978) (remarks of Sen. De Concini).
57. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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Dyne site was dischargeable as a claim. 8 The Court found no support
in the statute or legislative history for the state's argument that the
injunction did not fall within the Code's definition of "claim."5 9 Fur-
thermore, the Court agreed with the lower court's findings that the
state reduced the cleanup duty to a monetary obligation.' ° The Court
emphasized that its holding was narrowly confined to the facts and the
discharge issue. 6 '
Justice O'Connor wrote a brief concurring opinion, addressing the
state's concern that the Court's decision will hinder the enforcement of
state environmental laws.62 Justice O'Connor noted that although Ko-
vacs' obligation was dischargeable, the state could change its laws to
prevent recurring situations.63 Justice O'Connor suggested that the
state protect its interests by treating cleanup judgments as statutory
58. Id. at 275. The Supreme Court first rejected Kovacs' mootness argument. Id.
at 277. Kovacs argued that he no longer owed an obligation to the state because the
Army Corps of Engineers removed the industrial wastes. Id. Kovacs asserted that any
obligation he owed was to the United States, not Ohio. Id. The state argued that the
case was not moot because the surface cleanup did not satisfy all of Kovacs' obligations;
contaminated soil remained. Id. at 278. The Court rejected Kovacs' argument, con-
cluding that the state had a stake in the outcome of the case. Id.
59. Id. at 279-80. The state argued that the injunction was not a claim under 11
U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) on two grounds. First, Kovacs' default was a breach of statute, not
a breach of contractual duty. Id. at 279. Second, the obligation did not give rise to an
alternative right of payment within the meaning of the definition. Id. The Court con-
cluded that the statuory language did not indicate that a right of performance cannot be
a claim unless it arises from a contractual agreement. Id.
60. Id. at 282. The Court noted that the state chose to appoint a receiver instead of
taking other available action such as prosecution under the environmental laws or civil
and criminal contempt proceedings. Id. at 282-83. The Court found that the receiver
sought money from Kovacs to pay for the cleanup. Id. at 283. The Court also noted
that Ohio attempted to discover Kovacs' post-petition income. Id. at 282 (quoting In re
Kovacs, 717 F.2d at 987-88). Finally, the Court pointed out that during oral argument,
Ohio's counsel conceded that after the appointment of the receiver the only perform-
ance sought was the payment of money. Id. at 282.
61. Id. at 284-85. The Court noted five issues that were not decided. First, whether
Kovacs' discharge would shield him from further prosecution or criminal contempt for
not performing his obligations prior to bankruptcy. Id. at 284. Second, if a fine or
penalty had been imposed by the state prior to bankruptcy, his obligation to pay the fine
or penalty would not be discharged. Id. Third, what the legal effect would have been if
Kovacs had taken bankruptcy before a receiver and trustee had been designated. Id.
Fourth, the injunction against further pollution was not dischargeable. Id. at 285.
Fifth, the ultimate possessor of the Chem-Dyne site must make certain the site complies
with state envirionmental laws. Id.
62, Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 286.
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liens or secured claims, which are more difficult for debtors to dis-
charge.6' She pointed out that the Court's holding avoids potentially
adverse consequences if the debtor is a corporation rather than an
individual.65
The Court's decision in Kovacs II suggests a preference toward bank-
ruptcy interests over state environmental interests. In Penn Terra
66
the Third Circuit interpreted the Code narrowly with regard to the
automatic stay issue and found no conflict between the Code and state
police power objectives. The court held that a cleanup order was not a
money judgment or "claim" and, therefore, not subject to the auto-
matic stay."7 Under Midlantic68 the trustee or person in possession of
abandoned property must take steps to adequately protect public
health and safety. The Court did not disclose the precautions that are
necessary to make the abandoned property adequately safe. Such pro-
tective measures, however, require the expenditure of money.6 9 In the
case of a debtor in possession, such expenditure may be interpreted as a
monetary obligation or "claim" against the debtor and dischargeable
under Kovacs I.
The Court intended the holding in Kovacs II to be narrowly confined
to the discharge issue.7" If Kovacs II is interpreted to hold that all
environmental cleanup orders are essentially monetary judgments,
however, a conflict will arise between state environmental regulations
and the Code's automatic stay provision.7" The courts, therefore, will
64. Id.
65. Id. See supra note 51 for a discussion of a corporate debtor in bankruptcy. If
Kovacs' obligation is not a claim under the Code, neither is the obligation of a debtor
corporation. Baird & Jackson, supra note 51, at 1203. The definition of claim does not
depend on whether the debtor is an individual or a corporation. Thus, the state will
have no postbankruptcy recourse against a corporate debtor because corporations usu-
ally dissolve after distributing funds to those creditors with claims. Id. Thus, when the
debtor is a corporation, a state's only avenue of relief may be its "claim" to the preban-
kruptcy assets. Id. Baird and Jackson argue that Kovacs 11 presents two different is-
sues. First, the status of the rights of state and federal governments toward a debtor's
existing assets to enforce cleanup orders. Second, whether an individual's right to dis-
charge prebankruptcy obligations includes discharging a duty to cleanup toxic wastes.
Id. at 1200.
66. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 36 for a discussion of possible minimal safeguard requirements.
70. See supra note 61.
71. Kovacs 11 held that Ohio's environmental cleanup order was essentially a mone-
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enforce the Code's automatic stay provision over state law.72 In addi-
tion, courts may treat the obligation to maintain abandoned property
as a monetary claim dischargeable in bankruptcy. As a result, Kovacs
I1 may allow more opportunities for polluting individuals and busi-
nesses to use bankruptcy as an escape from expensive cleanup obliga-
tions at the expense of the environment.
John T. Rawlings
tary obligation and thus a "right to payment" under the Code's claim provision. 469
U.S. at 280-83. Likewise, the environmental cleanup order can also be a monetaryjudgment under the Code's automatic stay provision. See supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
72. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal
preemption.
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